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The world economy at the turn of the
millennium toward boom or crisis?
Robert Brenner
Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, UCLA
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the question of whether the long stagnation that
gripped the world economy for a quarter century after 1973 has been trans-
cended. To do so, it offers an account of the long downturn, in terms of
the fall and failure of recovery of the protability, especially in the inter-
national manufacturing sector, itself rooted in the rise and persistence of
over-capacity and over-production on a system-wide scale, originating 
in the intensication of international competition between 1965 and 1973.
In that context, it nds the source of the current boom in the US in a
recovery of manufacturing protability between 1985 and 1995. But,
because the US recovery came heavily at the expense of protability and
economic dynamism elsewhere, leaving the underlying problem of inter-
national over-capacity and over-production unresolved, it raises the
question of the boom’s sustainability, especially in light of the fact that
the beginnings of manufacturing recovery in Japan and Germany after
1995 led to the East Asian crisis and new protability problems in the US.
Rapid expansion in the US has thus been driven most recently by fast-
growing consumption, rooted in the stock market bubble and the associated
growth of debt, so its future remains in doubt.
KEYWORDS
World economy; US economy; economic crisis; economic history; long
wave; economic stagnation.
INTRODUCTION: 1998–2000 – FROM CRISIS TO BOOM?
Not very long ago, in the autumn of 1998, the world economy seemed
in deep trouble. The East Asian crisis was in the process of engulng
not just Russia, Brazil and other Third World countries, but also Japan.
It was also threatening to bring down the US economy. In the US, leading
stock market indices fell by 20 percent between July and September 1998.
By October, credit was drying up and a liquidity crisis seemed to be at













































Folio Review of International Political Economy









































hand. At this point the US Federal Reserve Board intervened. Fed chair
Alan Greenspan took the extraordinary step of engineering the bailout
of the huge Long Term Credit Management hedge fund, on the grounds
that its bankruptcy could have precipitated a worldwide economic
collapse. Then, the Fed lowered interest rates on three successive occa-
sions, signalling to the equity markets that it would not allow stock
prices to fall any further and that it wanted them to rise, in order to
stimulate the US economy.
Since that time, the US economic expansion of the 1990s, which became
rapid only from 1996, has continued to accelerate, and now seems to be
pulling the rest of the world along with it. The question that thus poses
itself is: what is the true state of the world economy today? Will the
current boom continue, or will the world economy stumble, returning to
stagnation or deeper crisis? Lurking behind that question is a bigger one.
Is the world economy today nally at the end of the long downturn that
has gripped it since 1973 and on the verge of a new long upturn, like
that of the period from the end of the 1940s to the beginning of the 1970s?
The proper way to confront these questions is by grasping the
dynamics of the long downturn itself. I will present my understanding
of the long downturn’s origins, the causes of its perpetuation and the
phases of its development.1 On that basis, I will attempt to characterize
the current conjuncture.
1 EXPLAINING THE LONG DOWNTURN: FROM LONG
POST-WAR BOOM TO PERSISTENT STAGNATION
As is well understood, the post-war economy has gone through two
major phases. During the long boom between the end of the 1940s and
the early 1970s, most of the advanced capitalist economies (outside the
US and the UK) experienced record-breaking rates of investment, output,
productivity and wage growth, along with low unemployment and only
brief and mild recessions. But during the long downturn that followed,
the growth of investment fell signicantly and issued in much-reduced
productivity growth and sharply-slowed wage growth (if not absolute
decline), along with depression level unemployment (outside the US)
and a succession of serious recessions and nancial crises.
A secular crisis of protability
To understand the long downturn, the place to start is with the trajec-
tory of protability. The single key to the long boom was thus sustained,
high rates of prot across the advanced capitalist economies, which made
possible and motivated the rapid growth of investment. The onset 
of the long downturn was precipitated by a sharp fall in protability,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































especially in manufacturing, from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, which
initiated a major slowdown in investment growth. The reason that the
downturn so persisted is that the rate of prot for the leading capitalist
economies – the US, Germany and Japan – so long failed to recover 
and the same is true for the G-7 economies taken in aggregate. In a
nutshell, the persistence of low protability has been responsible for the
persistence of the low rate of capital accumulation on a world scale that
has been the basic source of the difculties that have marked the long
downturn.
In seeking to explain the fall in the rate of prot, my general point of
departure is the anarchy of capitalist production. I start, in particular,
with the pressure on capitalist enterprises, which derives from their
subjection to competition, to cut costs as the condition for their very
survival. The resulting tendencies to the accumulation of capital and to
innovation are, of course, at the root of capitalism’s historically unprece-
dented capacity for developing the productive forces. But, occurring as
they do in an unplanned, competitive manner, these tendencies are also,
I would argue, at the source of capitalism’s tendencies to periodic crisis
and stagnation. This is because individual capitalists have no interest in
and are in any case incapable of, taking account of the aggregate effects
of their actions . . . specically the destructive impact of their cost cutting
on already-existing capitals and on the ability of those capitals to yield
prots.
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Figure 1 US manufacturing, German manufacturing and Japanese non-nancial







































Intractable problems thus tend to arise because, when innovating rms
cut costs and thereby seize increased market share, even while main-
taining for themselves the established average rate of prot, they render
obsolete the xed capital that their rivals introduced earlier. Plant and
equipment that at the point of its introduction represented the most up-
to-date technique but which needed to be operated for an extended
period to recover its cost and provide sufcient returns is thus rendered
insufciently protable in the face of the new, lower prices that have
been imposed by the ‘premature’ introduction of new, even more produc-
tive xed capital. The aggregate outcome is thus redundant investment
– making for over-capacity and over-production in given lines – which
is expressed in prices that have been rendered too low to allow the non-
innovating rms to realize their former rates of return, given their now
too high costs of production. Not only are some rms obliged to accept
a rate of prot below the established average rate but others, for whom
prices have fallen too low to allow them to make a prot even on their
variable or circulating capital alone (their new placements of raw mate-
rials, labour, intermediate goods), are forced to retire from the industry.
With the innovator still making the established, average rate of prot
and the others making below it, the rate of prot in the industry falls.
Assuming that capitalists outside the ‘affected’ industry fail to garner all
and that workers derive some of the benets from the affected industry’s
reduced price – i.e. that capitalists do not get to buy all and workers
get to buy some of that industry’s output, leading to an increase in their
real wage – the rate of prot in the economy in aggregate falls.2
1.2 Uneven development: from long boom to long downturn
To be more concrete – and to combine, for the sake of brevity, the con-
ceptual and historical aspects of my argument – I would assert that the
key to the fall in the rate of prot that set off the long downturn – and
also to the long-term failure of protability to recover right into the 
1990s – was the emergence, and persistence, of over-capacity and over-
production on a system-wide scale focused on the international manufactur-
ing sector, beginning in the mid-1960s. Over-capacity and over-production
in manufacturing emerged out of a process of uneven development –
which was marked by the competitive interaction between rms of the
early developing, technologically advanced but relatively inertial, bloc 
of capital of the US and rms of the later developing, dynamic blocs of 
capital of Japan, Europe and (later) East Asia. The process of uneven
development underlay the spectacular economic dynamism of long boom
by enabling the advanced capitalist economies to sustain the high rates 
of prot that they attained in the years immediately following World 
War II. It issued in the onset of the over-capacity and over-production in




















































































manufacturing that was at the root of the protability crisis. It was respon-
sible for difculties of the system in transcending over-capacity and over-
production that were behind the extended perpetuation of stagnation.
The long upturn
What made for the unprecedented economic expansion of the post-World
War II boom was the ability of the rms of the later-developing economies
– especially Germany and Japan, but also France, Italy, and others – to
exploit the enormous potential advantages of being followers technolog-
ically, backward socio-economically, and ‘hegemonized’ militarily and
nancially vis-à-vis the earlier-developing economies – above all the US,
but also the UK – so as to sustain high rates of prot and on that basis,
record breaking waves of capital accumulation and growth. The
employers in these economies initially achieved the high rates of prot
and of international competitiveness that constituted the pre-condition
for the post-war long boom by means of the repression or containment
of militant worker uprisings in the years immediately following World
War II – especially with the aid of tough deationary stabilization
programmes, imposed directly by US occupational authorities or under
pressure from the US government (Armstrong et al., 1991). To maintain
high protability and international competitiveness, they took advantage
of huge pools of disguisedly unemployed workers in their still relatively
backward rural sectors, so as to keep wage growth relatively low com-
pared to productivity growth (Kindleberger, 1967). They also exploited
the possibilities of catch-up, adopting cheap but advanced US technology
while succeeding, in many cases, in innovating so to forge ahead, espe-
cially by means of learning by doing in the process of laying down huge
masses of new capital stock (Abramovitz, 1977; Abramovitz, 1994). The
leading enterprises of these economies focused on export-oriented manu-
facturing and, in so doing, were strongly supported by banks that were
closely tied to manufacturers, as well as by governments that offered,
among other things, a certain degree of protection, subsidies and cheap
currencies. As a result, the huge gains in productive effectiveness that
they accrued redounded, for the most part, to the benet of the domestic
economies. This was in sharp contrast to basic trends in the relatively
inertial, hegemonic US economy, which witnessed an epoch-making move
toward internationalization via the overseas expansion of its dynamic
multinational corporations and banks, strongly supported by the US state,
which undertook massive unproductive military expenditures to keep the
world safe from communism (Block, 1977).
The technologically following, later developing and hegemonized
economies, especially Japan and Germany, were enabled to grow with
unprecedented speed by virtue of their ability to take advantage of the
unusually rapid growth of world trade and the world division of labour




















































































of the rst post-war quarter century and thereby to build large, fast
growing domestic manufacturing sectors, sites of the most rapid produc-
tivity growth (Kaldor, 1971). The German and Japanese economies
prospered in particular by virtue of their ability to serve as hubs for
dynamic regional economic blocs in Europe and East Asia respectively
– supplying them with increasingly high powered capital goods and
offering them huge and rapidly growing markets for their output
(although Japan’s tolerance for manufactured imports was strictly
limited). Still, the extraordinary rates of export growth that drove the
economies of both Germany and Japan were ultimately made possible
only by the ability of German and Japanese producers to wrest ever
greater shares of that market from US and UK producers and, in partic-
ular to penetrate the enormous US market (Maizels, 1963: 189, 200–201,
220; Morgan, 1980: 48; Brenner, 1998).
The fact remains that, despite entailing relative US decline, the post-
war pattern of uneven development was hardly a zero-sum game and
was indeed quite indispensable for US economic vitality. Domestically-
based US manufacturing exporters thus depended for their own
dynamism on their overseas customers’ ability to enhance their
purchasing power and accumulate reserves, and the latter of course
depended on their rivals’ ability to produce efciently and export. On
the other hand, they long suffered relatively little damage from intensi-
fying international competition because they had begun with such an
enormous technological lead and were long able to dominate the huge
US domestic market, even while ceding huge chunks of their overseas
markets to producers abroad. Because the US economy was so much
larger than those of its rivals, US competitors’ appropriation of export
markets from US producers and even their limited penetration of the US
market itself could have a major positive effect on their domestic
economies, while having only a minor negative impact on US producers.
By the same token, the ability of US multinationals and banks to expand
their overseas operations depended on the renewed economic dynamism
of the follower, later-developing, hegemonized economies. The interde-
pendent evolution of the internationalizing, leading economy of the US
and of the export-oriented follower economies of Germany and Japan
thus turned out to instantiate a highly dynamic, if ultimately highly
unstable, symbiosis. It was for this reason that, for much of the rst post-
war quarter century, the exercise of US hegemony, obviously shaped by
US economic and political interests could, to a signicant degree, be
responsive as well to the needs for economic expansion of the US
producers’ economic rivals and manifest a relatively high degree of inter-
national cooperation.




















































































The onset of over-capacity and over-production: US manufacturing, 1965–73
Nevertheless, uneven development by way of the growth of trade and
the world division of labour did not forever remain only favourable in
its economic effects. From the end of the 1950s, with the restoration 
of convertibility and lowering of trade barriers, the growth of commerce
began to accelerate even further, with contradictory effects. On the one
hand, producers in Western Europe and Japan exploited gains from trade
to secure the fastest rates of economic expansion of the post-war epoch
during the second half of the 1960s. On the other hand, due precisely
to the accelerated growth of trade, new producers without warning began
to supply radically increased fractions of the world market. These manu-
facturers had previously been producing for their home markets bundles
of goods that were quite similar to those already being produced by the
leading, earlier developing, and hegemonic economies, especially the US
(OECD, 1987: 267). It was therefore hardly surprising that the goods that
they turned out to export tended to be redundant, rather than comple-
mentary, to already-existing products, tending to challenge the
incumbents’ output for markets and to invite over-capacity and over-
production.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, manufacturers based in the later-
developing blocs – most especially in Japan, but also in Germany and in
other parts of Western Europe – were thus able to combine relatively
advanced techniques and relatively low wages to sharply reduce relative
costs vis-à-vis those in the US. On this basis, they dramatically increased
their shares of the world market and imposed on that market their rela-
tively low prices; but, precisely by virtue of their relatively reduced costs,
they succeed simultaneously in maintaining their old rates of prot. US
producers thus found themselves facing slower growing prices for their
output, but caught with inexible costs as a result of their being stuck
with xed capital embodying suddenly outmoded technology. Those 
capitals which could no longer make the old or average rate of prot
even on their circulating capital alone – i.e. on the labour power, raw
materials and intermediate goods that were needed operate their xed
capital (plant and equipment) – had to shed productive capacity and/or
reduce capital utilization. Others, in order to hold on to their markets,
had little choice but to accept signicantly reduced rates of prot on their
xed capital, since they could not raise prices above costs as much as
they had previously.
As a consequence of the unplanned-for irruption of lower-priced goods
onto the market, US manufacturing producers thus turned out to 
have over-invested, in the sense that they were unable to realize the old,
established rate of return on their placements of xed capital due to 
the outrunning of demand by supply in their industries. System-wide
over-capacity and over-production, which manifested itself in a declining




















































































system-wide rate of return on capital stock in manufacturing, was the
result. Between 1965 and 1973, the US manufacturing sector sustained
a fall in the rate of prot on its capital stock of over 40 percent. Thus,
even though the manufacturing sectors of Japan and of the leading
European economies were simultaneously able, at least until 1969–73, to
maintain (though not by and large increase) their rates of prot, the
manufacturing sectors of the G-7 economies taken in aggregate, a surro-
gate for international manufacturing as a whole, saw their prot rate
fall by 25 percent between 1965 and 1973.
The crisis spreads via the collapse of the world monetary system
The Japanese, German and other European economies did not long
remain immune from the aggregate decline in protability. As an expres-
sion of declining manufacturing competitiveness, US trade and current
account balances fell precipitously (and German and Japanese trade and
current account balances rose correspondingly). Simultaneously, as a
result of rising foreign investment and rapidly increasing military expen-
ditures associated with the Vietnam War, US balance of payments decits
skyrocketed. Huge downward pressure was thus exerted on the dollar,
and the world monetary system was propelled into crisis. Between 1971
and 1973, the Bretton Woods system of xed exchange rates was jetti-
soned and the US dollar sharply devalued, while the mark and yen were
correspondingly revalued. Japanese and German manufacturers were
thereby burdened with sharply rising relative costs vis-à-vis those of their
US rivals and obliged to shoulder a much greater share than hitherto of
the fall in aggregate protability that had struck the G-7 manufacturing
economies. But, it was evidence of the degree to which over-capacity
and over-production had by this point gripped world manufacturing
that US producers, though beneting from the dollar’s fall, were unable
to come close to restoring their boom time prot rates. Due to the onset
of over-capacity and over-production, world manufacturing prices had
been unable to grow in line with product wages and the cost of plant
and equipment: the result was falling prot shares and output-capital
ratios, making for falling prot rates (Brenner, 1998: 116–137).
The fundamental role of intensied international competition leading
to over-capacity and over-production in forcing down prot rates, both
in the US and in the leading capitalist economies more generally, is
evidenced in the fact that the decline in protability was heavily concen-
trated in the manufacturing sector, composed mostly of tradables and
therefore vulnerable to international competition and only lightly touched
the non-manufacturing sector, composed mostly of nontradables and
therefore largely immune from international competition . . . even though
costs rose substantially faster in non-manufacturing than in manufacturing in
the years when protability fell.




















































































It needs to be emphasized, nally, that the private economy as a whole
saw its prot rate decline as a consequence of the fall in the rate of prot
in the manufacturing sector that resulted from the relative repression of
price increases in international manufacturing. Had capitalists outside
of manufacturing succeeded in garnering all of the gains that were
derived from the slowed growth of manufacturing prices, they would
have secured increases in prots sufcient to match the reductions in














































Table 2 The growth of costs, prices, and protability in the US, 1965–73
(average annual rates of change)
NPR NPSH RW PW LPY NW ULC PP NY/ NY/ NKpri
NK NK 
real
Mfgr 2 5.5 2 2.7 1.9 4.0 3.3 6.4 3.05 2.3 2 3.2 2 0.4 5.2
Nmfgr 2 3.0 2 2.0 2.7 2.8 2.35 7.2 4.7 4.25 2 1.1 0.0 5.6
Adjusted for indirect business taxes
Mfgr. 2 6.0 2 2.8 1.9 4.2 3.3 6.4 3.05 2.1 2 3.4 2 0.4 5.2
Nmfgr 2 1.7 2 0.7 2.7 2.7 2.35 7.2 4.7 4.4 2 1.0 0.0 5.6
Not Adjusted for indirect business taxes
Key: NPR (Net Prot Rate), NPSH (Net Prot Share), RW (Real Wage), (PW) Product Wage,
LPY (Labour Productivity), (ULC) Unit Labour Costs, (PP) Product Price, NY/NK (Output-



































































































prots sustained by rms inside manufacturing; in that case, a rise in
the non-manufacturing prot rate would have compensated from the
fall in the manufacturing prot rate. No fall in the aggregate prot rate
for the private business economy as a whole would then have occurred.
But, in view of the composition of manufacturing output, specically
the major place of consumer goods within it, it was a foregone conclu-
sion that workers would share in these gains, increasing their real wages.
Moreover, since employers outside of manufacturing did not suffer
reductions in their own prot rates as a result of the increased real wages
that their workers derived from the slowed growth of output prices in
manufacturing, they felt no added pressure to attempt to reduce the
growth of nominal wages. The upshot was that, between 1965 and 1973,
the rate of prot in the private business economy fell by some 30 percent
in the US and by almost a quarter in the G-7 taken in aggregate.
What remains, perhaps, the dominant interpretation of the long down-
turn – advanced by representatives of the Social Structure of
Accumulation School in the US and the French Regulation School, as
well as interpreters from a variety of other theoretical political stand-
points – understands the initial fall in protability, and the failure of
protability to recover, in terms of power of and pressure from labour.
This is believed to have derived, in the short run, from tightening labour
markets that accompanied the long boom during the 1960s and, in the
longer run, from the decline in both the risk and the cost of unem-
ployment that resulted from the welfare state commitment to full
employment and extension of unemployment insurance (Armstrong,
1991; Glyn et al., 1990; Boddy and Crotty, 1975; Bowles et al., 1985; Boyer,
1988; Sachs, 1979).
There is of course no reason to deny that tightened labour markets,
resulting from extended periods of economic expansion tend to
strengthen labour and lead to upward pressure on real wages. Still, it
is equally true that the very same processes of rapid capital accumula-
tion that tend to entail rising costs also tend set off countertendencies
that raise protability – notably increased capacity utilization and faster
productivity growth. Meanwhile, the same rising wages that result from
increased demand for labour tend to provoke, in compensation, increased
labour supply by inducing stepped-up immigration, the increased export
of capital, and labour-saving technical change.
Still, the bottom line point is not that the exercise of power by workers
can never bring down protability – for surely there are times when it
does – but that workers’ pressure cannot sustain an extended period of
reduced protability such as ensued from the later 1960s. The general
reason is that, where tight labour markets cause declining protability,
rms will inevitably respond to their reduced rates of return by cutting
back investment, bringing about a reduction in aggregate employment




















































































and thus of labour’s leverage. In the post-war epoch, a further mecha-
nism has ensured that prot squeezes brought on by increased pressure
from labour will be self-correcting. Firms suffering reduced protability
due to rising costs nd themselves decreasingly competitive because they
are less able to invest and thereby improve. If their protability does
not revive, they are obliged, in order survive, to soon reallocate invest-
ment to other places or industries. If they do not, they nd themselves
suffering further reduced protability or reduced market share because
of price-cost pressure from rms beyond the region affected by working-
class pressure. Workers who reduce their rm’s prot rates, therefore,
tend over time to price themselves out of the market.
The very fact that the squeezes on prots that set off the long down-
turn occurred simultaneously across the advanced capitalist world 
at almost precisely the same moment, between 1965 and 1973, makes it
hard to believe that increases in power and pressure from labour could
have been responsible. For it seems prima facie unlikely that such shifts
in the balance of class forces would occur at just the same time in
economies embedded in such different socio-political settings and with
such different histories of class relations, as make up the G-7. In fact, the
very evidence that speaks most strongly in favour of my argument that
the fall in protability resulted from the intensication of international
competition leading to over-capacity and over-production speaks most
strongly against the idea that it resulted from an increase in the power
of and pressure from labour. Thus, rising costs made themselves felt most
strongly in the non-manufacturing sectors of the US economy and the
G-7 economies in aggregate and least strongly in these economies’ manu-
facturing sectors, due to the much faster growth of productivity in
manufacturing than outside it. Yet, most of the fall in the rate of prot
in these economies was concentrated in the manufacturing sector, very
little outside of it . . . testimony, again, to the determining role of inten-
sied international competition and the resulting reduced ability to raise
prices in manufacturing.3
From protability crisis to long stagnation
Falling protability throughout the advanced capitalist world issued in
the worst recession since the 1930s with the coming of the oil embargo
at the end of 1973. Nevertheless, this was only the beginning of what
turned out to be a very extended downturn. Protability failed to recover
for the US, German or the Japanese economies, or the G-7 economies
taken in aggregate, before sometime in the 1990s, if then, and the result
was long-term economic stagnation, as reduced prot rates brought about
reduced investment growth, which made for reduced productivity
growth and reduced wage growth as well as rising unemployment.




















































































The question that therefore presents itself is: what accounts for the long
persistence of reduced prot rates? This question is all the more pressing,
in view of the fact that, right from the start and with immediate and
increasing success, employers supported by governments across the world
capitalist economy unleashed an ever-deepening attack on workers’ orga-
nizations and workers’ living standards, sharply reducing wage growth
and the growth of social spending and thereby very much alleviating
upward pressure from the growth of costs on the rate of prot. The
continuation of the protability crisis for more than two decades, in the
face of the success of the employers’ offensive in so powerfully shifting
the balance of class forces in favour of capital and so massively reducing
the growth of workers’ claims, constitutes, in my opinion, a strong case
against the view that an increase in workers’ power and pressure was
responsible for the long downturn. But it also poses a strong challenge
to my own interpretation. It is thus one thing to account for the initial
fall in protability between 1965 and 1973, as I have, in terms of over-
production and over-capacity. It is quite another to explain why reduced
protability so long persisted. In particular, why, in line with standard
expectations, did not rms suffering from falling protability in their
industries either go out of business or re-allocate means of production
into other industries with higher prot rates, so as to alleviate over-
capacity and over-production and restore the rate of prot? What
counter-tendencies prevented a smoother, quicker adjustment?














































Table 3 The growth of real wages (total economy) (average annual percentage)
1960–73 1973–79 1979–90 1990–98
US (compensation/hour) 2.8 0.3 0.4 0.3
Japan (compensation/employee) 7.7 2.8 1.6 0.5
Germany (compensation/employee) 5.4 2.5 1.0 0.9
Source: ‘Statistical Annex’, European Economy 64, 1997.
Table 4 The growth of real social expenditures (average annual percent
change)
1960–75 1975–80 1980–85
US 6.5 2.0 2.7
Germany 4.8 2.0 0.7
Japan 8.5 8.2 3.2
G-7 7.6 4.2 2.6
Source: OECD (1985) Social Expenditure 1960–89, Paris, p. 28; The Future of Social Protection







































First, the great corporations of the US, Germany and Japan that domi-
nated world manufacturing had better prospects for maintaining and
improving their protability by seeking to improve competitiveness in
their own industries than by reallocating means of production into other
lines. They possessed great amounts of sunk capital that they had already
paid for and which they could therefore make further use of ‘free of
charge’. As a result, at least for a time, they could generally make higher
rates of prot on their new investments in circulating capital (labour,
raw materials, semi-nished goods) in their own industries than they
could on new investment in other ones. Though they suffered reduced
rates of prot on their total capital, it nonetheless made sense for them
to stay put. These corporations maintained, moreover, long-established
relations with suppliers and customers that could not easily, or without
great cost, be duplicated in other lines. Most important perhaps, they
had, over a long period, developed hard-won specialized technical
knowledge of production that they could apply only in their own indus-
tries. Prospects for proting from new investment thus seemed better in
their own lines, despite the over-capacity and over-production, than 
in transferring to new ones. During the 1970s and after US, German and
Japanese corporations tended to nd it more promising to ght than to
switch, and did not generally relinquish their positions unless they were
forced to. As a result, there was insufcient exit.
Second, even despite the reduced protability in world manufacturing
lines, the process of uneven development continued and emergent low-
cost producers, based especially in East Asia, found it protable to enter
many of those lines, just as had their predecessors from Japan in anal-
ogous circumstances. There was therefore too much entry, further
exacerbating over-capacity and over-production.
Third, Keynesian policies – which began to be widely implemented
in the early-mid 1960s at the rst sign of economic difculties in the
advanced capitalist economies and became quasi-universal with the slide
into crisis and stagnation in the 1970s – actually contributed to the perpet-
uation of over-capacity and over-production in manufacturing and thus
helped to prevent a decisive recovery of protability. By increasing
demand, decit spending and easy credit thus allowed many high cost,
low prot manufacturers that would otherwise have gone bankrupt to
continue in business and maintain positions that might otherwise even-
tually have been occupied by lower cost, higher prot producers. But,
given their low surpluses, such weakened rms could hardly undertake
much capital investment or expansion. On the contrary. In response to
any given increase in aggregate demand resulting from Keynesian poli-
cies, rms were rendered unable, as a consequence of their reduced prot
rates, to bring about as great an increase in supply as in the past when
prot rates were higher. There was therefore ‘less bang for the buck’,




















































































with the result that the ever-increasing public decits of the 1970s brought
about not so much increases in output as accelerated rises in prices.
Keynesian stimulus policies were thus unquestionably necessary to
keep the world economy turning over; but governments’ long-term
commitment to such policies also prolonged stagnation. During the 1970s,
when decit spending was accommodated by easy credit, it brought
about ination. During the 1980s, when decit spending was re-intro-
duced to counterbalance the profound tightening of credit imposed by
Volcker and Thatcher, it staved off a crash. By thus sustaining a certain
stability over close to two decades, in the face of sharply reduced prot
rates, the slowed growth of investment and increasing numbers of rms 
on the edge of bankruptcy deficit spending prevented the imposition of
the harsh medicine of depression that had, historically, cleared the way
for new upturns by eliminating great masses of high cost, low prot
means of production; but, in the process, it reduced – over a long period
– the potential dynamism of the system.
2 THE ROOTS OF THE CURRENT CONJUNCTURE
The roots of the current conjuncture are to be found in the working out
of three fundamental, closely interrelated long-term trends. All three of
these were set off, right from 1965–73, by the fall and failure to recover
of system-wide protability, which was itself rooted in the emergence
and persistence of over-capacity and over-production in international
manufacturing and all three have continued to work themselves out right
up to the present.
The slowed growth of aggregate demand
Reduced protability provoked, alongside a system-wide reduction in the
growth of investment, ever-tightening world-wide austerity, designed to cut
costs and restore the rate of return. This involved the ever greater repres-
sion of the growth of wages and social spending and the stage-by-stage
relinquishing of policies of demand stimulus. The resulting slowdown in
the growth of aggregate demand – investment, consumer and government
– tended to intensify the underlying problem of over-capacity and over-
production in manufacturing in two respects. It enforced an ever greater
turn to increased exports across the world economy, to compensate for
the slowed growth of domestic purchases. Second, by slowing the growth
of discretionary expenditures and increasing the riskiness of investment,
it discouraged the re-allocation of capital out of oversubscribed lines into
entirely new lines of production.
Globalization
The slowdown in the growth of aggregate demand that resulted from
reduced protability, the ensuing exacerbation of over-capacity and over-




















































































production in manufacturing and historically-elevated real interest rates
from the start of the 1980s brought home the growing difculty, at least
for the time being, of making further protable investments in the real
economy. The consequence was a series of interrelated, epoch-making
shifts in the operation of the international economy, compared to the
way it worked during the long boom, that go under the somewhat
misleading term of ‘globalization’: 1) from a relatively high level of inter-
national cooperation to intensied international conict; 2) from the relative
repression of nance to the freedom and ascendancy of nance; and 3) from
an historically unprecedented level of peacetime state regulation of the
economy to deepening economic liberalization.
1 As competition among rms intensied and economic gains, in the
context of stagnating output and demand came increasingly to take
place via zero-sum games, governments came increasingly to the aid
of nationally-based enterprises by introducing measures aimed at
defending domestic markets and securing access to overseas markets
– including straightforward protectionism, currency devaluation and
what can only be called imperialist intervention to open up hitherto
protected domestic economies. Not just rms, then, but the states
behind them were set at loggerheads.
2 As it became ever more difcult to make money in the real economy,
especially with the turn to tight credit at the end of the 1970s, capi-
talists undertook an accelerating shift into lending and speculation,
their way very much paved by governments across the advanced capi-
talist world. This failed to produce positive results for the world
economy and was, as a rule, able to benet its progenitors only by
way of massive assistance from governments. But it profoundly aggra-
vated the ongoing tendency to increased international instability.
3 As the balance of class forces shifted ever more decisively toward
capital, especially as capital accumulation slowed and the economy
stagnated, the role of the state was steadily transformed – from
providing a safety net to securing labour exibility, from constricting
the operation of nance to nancial de-regulation and the suspension
of capital controls and from subsidizing demand so as to raise employ-
ment to restricting credit and spending so as to raise unemployment.
US economic revival
In response to sharply reduced manufacturing protability, US business,
backed by the US state, launched an ever more powerful counter-
offensive to regain manufacturing competitiveness at the expense of both
labour and its overseas rivals, while seeking to defend and consolidate
its dominance of international nancial services. The offensive within
manufacturing was marked by a two-decade long repression of wage




















































































growth, a secular fall in the value of the dollar, an accelerating shakeout
of high cost, low prot means of production and ultimately an impor-
tant recovery of manufacturing protability and investment. The
offensive within nance was underpinned by the most persistent govern-
mental efforts to insure nancial rates of return. The question thus posed
at the start of the new millennium is whether the US economy, having
enjoyed major recoveries in the rate of return on investment in both
manufacturing and nance during the rst half of the 1990s, can sustain
the boom that it was nally able to achieve during the second half of
the 1990s in the face the international crisis that began in East Asia and
pull the rest of the world economy along with it.
2.1 The failure of Keynesianism and the impasse of international
manufacturing, 1973–79
The Nixon administration’s closing of the gold window, which ended
dollar convertibility, its adoption of oating exchange rates and its resort
to ultra-expansionary monetary policy to stimulate the economy and
push down value of the dollar marked the turning point in the pivotal
shift away from the relatively high level of international economic 
cooperation that had characterized the post-war epoch and toward more
intense international economic conict. Even before that time, from the
start of the 1960s, the US had assumed an increasingly aggressive stance
in order maintain the sanctity of the dollar, demanding its allies and
competitors sell gold to support the dollar and hold onto dollars to keep
up US gold reserves, even as it insisted on pursuing an expansionary
macro-policy, while its payments decits grew and its competitive posi-
tion declined. But the allies and rivals of the US were caught in a bind:
they disliked the US’s exploitation of the Bretton Woods system through
its mounting decits and overvalued exchange rate; yet they had reason
to fear even more what turned out to be the alternative – the end of the
overvalued dollar, leading to the decline in their own manufacturing
competitiveness and the depreciation of their huge dollar holdings (De
Cecco, 1976; Hudson, 1972; Eichengreen, 1996; Block, 1977).
By reneging on the US’s obligation to convert dollars into gold in 1971,
Nixon freed his administration from the necessity to deate the economy
to restore the balance of payments and enabled it to pursue Keynesian
expansionary policies aimed at supporting domestic growth, devaluing
the dollar in aid of manufacturing competitiveness and depreciating the
‘dollar overhang’, the dollar reserves held abroad by foreign governments
and individuals. During the 1970s, Presidents Ford and Carter continued
the policy of incurring growing public decits so as to increase demand
and, by inviting ination, to reduce real interest rates below zero and to
bring down the value of the dollar a great deal further (Parboni, 1981).




















































































In this more favourable context of declining absolute and relative costs,
US manufacturers sought to invest their way out of the crisis, actually
maintaining investment growth at its level of the 1960s, while reducing
dividend payments out of prots and stepping up borrowing to do so.
(At the same time, foreign investors sharply increased their direct invest-
ment in the US.) By stepping up capital accumulation, US manufacturers
were able to maintain the growth of productivity fairly well in the face
of two oil crises and this did have a positive effect on their ability to
export and, ultimately, their prot rates. Nevertheless, despite a major
improvement in their relative cost position in international terms, US
manufacturers were unable to increase either their rates of prot or their
share of world export markets during the 1970s, because their counter-
parts overseas were unwilling to politely cede the eld to their US rivals.
Assisted by governments, as well as supportive nancial institutions,
US manufacturers’ overseas competitors, notably in Japan and Germany,
accepted reduced prot rates in order to retain, or even expand, their
shares of world export markets. In Japan, with the collaboration of the
state, the banks and other members of their industrial groups (keiretsu),
manufacturing rms unleashed an extraordinary process of across-the-
board restructuring. There was, therefore, little or no alleviation of
international over-capacity and over-production, with the result that by
1978–9 protability for the G-7 manufacturing economies in aggregate,
as well as for the US, German and Japanese manufacturing economies
taken separately, had dropped somewhat further, falling below their
already-reduced 1973 levels and creating the potential for severe crisis,
even depression. (The fact that protability outside manufacturing, which
had fallen relatively little between 1965 and 1973, actually increased to
some extent despite incurring cost increases at least as great as those 
in manufacturing, evidences, once again, the roots of the protability
decline in over-capacity and overproduction.)
The upshot, by the end of the 1970s, was a profound impasse for inter-
national manufacturing, as well as for the Keynesian subsidies to demand
that had been designed to buttress it. The US macro-policy of record
federal decits, extreme monetary ease, and ‘benign neglect’ with respect
to the exchange rate, had brought not only runaway ination, but also
record current account decits, which led, by 1977–8, to an outright 
run on the US currency that threatened the dollar’s position as interna-
tional reserve currency. The way was thus opened up for a major change
of perspective. Almost unbelievably, it was now the US which 
was obliged to accept a programme of ‘stabilization,’ and the result was
something of a revolution. The advanced capitalist governments now
turned to monetarist tight credit and so-called supply-side measures
aimed at cutting costs further. Since the debt-based subsidy to demand 
that had been keeping the world economy turning over in the face of




















































































manufacturing over-capacity and over-production was now suspended,
renewed deep recession was unavoidable (Brenner, 1998: 157–80).
2.2 Deepening international stagnation and US economic revival,
1979–95
Rising Real Interest Rates, Declining Growth of Aggregate Demand and the
Turn to Finance
The introduction in 1979 by Volcker and Carter of extreme monetarist
austerity was designed to raise unemployment so as to lower wage
growth, but was also aimed at the existing over-capacity and over-
production. The idea was to shake out that great ledge of high-cost, low
prot rms that had been sustained by the Keynesian expansion of credit
and to restore protability. Nevertheless, the implementation of what
might be termed pure monetarism was incompatible with the mainte-
nance of even a modicum of economic stability. By summer 1982, sharply
restricted credit and a rising dollar had detonated the Latin American
debt crisis and, by threatening to bring down some of the world’s leading
banks, had threatened to precipitate a crash starting in the US.
Keynesianism had to be brought back with a vengeance, and a monu-
mental programme of military spending and tax reduction was
introduced to offset the ravages of monetarist tight credit. But with record
high government decits coming to combine with ongoing tight credit,
the inability of policy to overcome the underlying problem of over-
capacity and over-production now manifested itself in unprecedentedly
elevated real interest rates (Greider, 1987).
Especially in view of the failure of protability to recover, the result
of record high real interest rates was a further deepening of investment
stagnation and the rate of growth of capital stock fell everywhere, partic-
ularly in manufacturing. Everywhere outside the US, moreover, there
was scal tightening, a slowdown in the growth of government expen-
diture. Meanwhile, the slowed growth of output brought rising joblessness
and this, combined with a further step-up of the employers’ assault on
labour, brought an even further slowing of wage growth. The combina-
tion of declining investment, declining government expenditure growth
and declining growth of real wages could only mean a major slowdown
in the growth of aggregate demand . . . which made the already-existing
problem of over-capacity and over-production in manufacturing that
much more difcult to transcend.
In the context of reduced returns on existing investment resulting from
ongoing over-capacity and over-production, the slowed growth of aggre-
gate demand and unprecedentedly high real interest rates, major new
placements of plant and equipment seemed, at the start of the 1980s,
unlikely to yield decent returns. A huge shift into nancial activity




















































































ensued, not only in the US but across the advanced capitalist economies,
reected in the growing share of the national product, as well as of
investment in plant and equipment going to nance, real estate and
insurance. Still, in the context of stagnation of the real productive
economy, lending and speculation could not in themselves be all that
promising, let alone support a transcendence of stagnation. Where the
state came in directly to support nancial and speculative prots, returns
to nanciers and speculators could be spectacularly good – as by way
of lending to the US government at ultra-high interest rates, proting
from privatization by the purchase of underpriced public assets, and
exploiting the US state-subsidized recovery of share prices in the 1980s,
set off by huge tax breaks to the corporations. But, where lending activity
in this period sought to be self-sustaining, it almost always took on a
speculative and usually disastrous form. The great wave of lending to
the third world and to oil patch producers, the turn by savings and loans
and commercial banks to loans for commercial real estate, and the epoch-
making movement toward debt-nanced mergers and acquisitions all
ended in serious crises . . . as well as ignominious, though lucrative,
government bail outs (Litan, 1991; White, 1992; Blair, 1993; Long and
Ravenscraft, 1993).
By the end of the 1980s, prot rates, though rising well above their
depths of the 1979–82 recession, had still failed to return to their levels
of 1973 (which were themselves, of course, far below their levels of the
long boom) in either the US, Germany, Japan or G-7 economies taken
in aggregate. One witnessed, in the meantime, especially as a result of
the huge wave of debt–nanced speculation throughout the decade, the
huge growth of corporate indebtedness and much worsened nancial
fragility of the banks, leading to a wave of bank failures unprecedented
since the 1930s (White, 1992; Bernanke and Campbell, 1988; Bernanke
and Lown, 1991). The recession of the early 1990s, starting in the US,
thus turned out to be much more serious and long lasting than expected.
In the wake of the recession of 1990–1, the international economy faced
a double bind. A new round of major US decits appeared to be required
to catalyse a new cyclical upturn domestically and internationally.
Increasing US subsidies to demand had, after all, helped to pull the
world economy out of every recession since 1970. But, given the enor-
mous build-up of debt during the 1980s, a new spate of borrowing
threatened to precipitate ination and a devastating credit crunch long
before it generated a new cyclical upturn. In 1993, led in nancial matters
by the new economic czar Robert Rubin, former CEO at Goldman Sachs,
the Clinton administration shifted decisively toward balancing the
budget.
The US’s move to scal austerity was of fundamental signicance
because it eliminated what had hitherto constituted the most important




















































































counter-tendency to the contractionary trend unleashed with the turn to
monetarism at the end of the 1970s – i.e. the experiment by Reagan and
Bush in military Keynesianism for the rich. Through most of the 1980s,
the advanced capitalist states outside the US had been progressively
restricting wage growth and slowing the increase of government
spending in the interest of reducing costs and raising protability. With
the US, too, turning to budget balancing, a signicant reduction in the
growth of aggregate demand for the world economy ensued, and 
the main ballast of the international system was eliminated. Squeezed
by the declining growth of domestic purchasing power, producers every-
where were obliged to sharply step up their orientation to exports, which
made for a further intensication of international competition, paving
the way for a certain exacerbation of international over-capacity and
over-production in manufacturing and creating the background condi-
tions for the world nancial crisis that began in East Asia in 1997. For
the G-7 economies taken as a whole (or the OECD economies taken
together), economic performance during the 1990s, in terms of all of the
major economic indicators, was even worse than that of the 1980s, which
was itself even worse than that of the 1970s, not to mention the 1960s.
In this context, the US economy, practically alone, was ultimately able
to prosper and it actually began to boom only from 1996.
The revitalization of the US economy in the context of deepening world
economic downturn
As stagnation continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s, a certain
reversal of the process of uneven development that had hitherto shaped
the evolution of the world economy began to take place. This was driven
by the revival of US manufacturing, which brought about at least a
partial changing of positions between the US, on the one hand, and
Germany and Japan, on the other . . . and offered at least the hope, in
the longer run of the transcendence of the long downturn for the world
economy.
The deep cyclical downturn of 1979–82 detonated the process of manu-
facturing rationalization and restructuring. Massive means of production














































Table 5 Exports accelerate as output stagnates (average annual percent change)
1960–73 73–79 79–90 90–97
OECD Real Exports (goods) 9.1 5.7 4.9 6.7
OECD Real GDP 4.9 2.8 2.6 2.4
Ratio of Exports to Output 1.85 2.0 1.9 2.8







































and labour were eliminated by means of an explosion of bankruptcies
and the large-scale shedding of suddenly unprotable plant and equip-
ment. The crisis of manufacturing was rendered deeper by record high
real interest rates and the huge rise in the dollar that these entailed. One
immediate result of the shakeout was a certain increase in productivity
growth. Another, however, was unsustainable US current account
decits, reecting the sharply reduced competitiveness that was entailed
by the runaway dollar. US manufacturing rms suffering from an
unprecedented loss of markets undertook a huge lobbying campaign to
bring down the currency, and the result was an abrupt and epoch-making
reversal of policy (Henning, 1994: 271–284).
The Plaza Accord of September 1985, in which Japan, Germany and
the US agreed to coordinate policies to bring down the overvalued dollar,
marked a watershed. It opened the way to 10 years of more or less
continuous and major devaluation of the dollar versus the yen and mark
– amounting to 40 to 60 percent – which was accompanied by a decade-
long freeze on real wage growth period. The outcome of the combination
of dollar devaluation, wage repression, and industrial shakeout – and
the increased manufacturing investment that nally ensued – was a
resumption of a fundamental shift in the modus operandi of US 
manufacturing toward a central role for exports. That shift had gotten
under way when the dollar’s value fell sharply between 1971 and 1978






























































1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
German marks/$



























































but had been temporarily interrupted by the imposition of high interest
rates and accompanying rise of the currency between 1979 and 1985.
Between 1985 and 1997, US exports grew more than 40 percent faster
than they had between 1950 and 1970 and, little by little, they began to
drive the manufacturing sector forward and thereby the whole economy.4
The path was very different outside manufacturing. There, one
witnessed the vast multiplication of low-productivity service jobs, as
average annual productivity growth outside manufacturing for the two
decades after 1975 fell to its lowest levels by far during the twentieth
century. This trend appears to have been driven, to a large extent, by
the stagnation, or even reduction, of real wages, which encouraged the
substitution of labour for capital. Between 1979 and 1995, real wages for
the bottom 60 percent of the labour force fell, on average, by 10 percent
(Mishel et al., 1999). It was, indeed, only the repression of wages that
made possible the maintenance of the prot rate outside of manufac-
turing (Brenner, 1998: 204–207).
The trends toward US manufacturing revitalization and the low wage
economy outside it, as well as to an ever greater focus on nance, were
ratied and deepened with the advent of the Clinton and Rubin in 1993.
Especially in the absence of the usual macroeconomic stimulus, which
resulted from the administration’s turn to budget balancing, the US
economy was able to emerge from the recession of the early 1990s only
very slowly, sustaining the so-called ‘jobless recovery’. But the slow
increase of GDP, accompanied by slowing ination and, above all, zero
wage growth, t very well the needs of a transformed US economy,
marked by a huge service sector with very low productivity growth, an
increasingly central ination-sensitive nancial sector and a manufac-
turing sector that was consistently exposed to tough international
competition.
Outside of manufacturing, although productivity growth continued at
record-low levels, a zero real wage growth for the 10 years between 1985
and 1995, allowed for a slow but steady rise in protability (the prot
rate had, in any case, fallen relatively little in non-manufacturing). But
the decisive changes took place in manufacturing. As it had from 1985,
the manufacturing sector continued to reduce its relative costs in inter-
national terms and, until just before mid-decade, it did so, as before,
without the benet of much investment growth, relying instead on the
ongoing shakeout of low prot, high cost means of production, the large-
scale devaluation of the dollar vis-à-vis the yen and the mark, and, of
course, the continuing repression of wage growth. The outcome was 
of seminal importance.
By 1995, manufacturing protability, while still far from full recovery,
had nonetheless risen, for the rst time since the start of the long down-
turn, decisively above its level of 1973, at which point it had fallen by




















































































40 percent from its 1965 peak (see Fig. 1. The prot rate for the busi-
ness economy as a whole was therefore nally able to closely approach,
if not quite reach, its boom-time peaks, with enormous consequences for
the economy as a whole. Thus, from 1993–4, investment growth took
off, and blossomed into a full-edged boom, which has entailed not just
high rates of capital accumulation, but the spectacular increase of expen-
ditures on computers and software, at about 20 percent per year. By
1999, computers and software were taking more than 35 percent of total
private non-residential investment, up from 27 percent in 1990 and under
20 percent in 1980 (US Council of Economic Advisors, 2000: 326, Table
B-16). From about the same time that investment growth accelerated and
almost certainly as a consequence, manufacturing labour productivity
growth also accelerated: from 1994 to the present it has been growing
as rapidly as in any other period of comparable length during the post-
war epoch and some 50 percent faster than it grew on average during
the post-war boom, from 1950 to 1973. During the second half of the
decade, the manufacturing productivity growth binge seems to have
been heavily responsible for what appears to be a notable improvement
in productivity growth for the economy as a whole.5
Finally, by mid-decade, the stock market boom was giving the now
accelerating cyclical upturn an extra llip by way of the wealth effect
and the economy as a whole was poised to take on the sort of dynamism
it failed to display since the early 1970s.
From US revival to German and Japanese crises
The US economic revival, which had its origins in the mid-1980s and
slowly gathered force during the rst half of the 1990s, found its reec-
tion internationally in deep recession, growing instability and extended
economic stagnation. Especially in the context of the heavily zero-
sum struggle for international export markets that ensued in the wake
of ever tightening worldwide economic austerity, the further improve-
ment in US international competitiveness imposed excruciating press-
ures on manufacturing exporters throughout much of the rest of the 
world.
The Japanese and German economies thus experienced deepening 
difculties from the time of the Plaza Accord and especially after 1990.
Even before 1985, high US interest rates had weakened the Japanese 
and German cyclical recoveries from the recession of the early 1980s 
by attracting funds away from domestic investment into US assets, 
especially Treasury bonds. During the decade after 1985, major increases
in Japanese and German real wages relative to US wages and enorm-
ous increases in the value of the yen and the mark relative to the 
dollar made for incipient crisis for both the Japanese and German 
manufacturing.




















































































Both economies were thus plagued, throughout the post-war epoch
by the same Achilles Heel, the tendency for their currencies to rise 
as an expression of their dependence on exports. In Germany, export
dynamism was sustained by restrictive scal and monetary policy aimed
at slowing the growth of domestic demand and keeping down the 
growth of prices. But the unavoidable outcome was relatively high
interest rates and rising trade balances that tended to produce an ever-
rising mark. In Japan, export dynamism was sustained by manufac-
turers commitment to purchasing their inputs from the other members
of their industrial groups, as well as a certain amount of implicit protec-
tionism, along with the holding down of household consumption. 
The resulting repression of import growth made for chronically grow-
ing trade surpluses and a rising yen. Especially as the growth of the 
US market slowed down, the inability of either economy to break 
from their established patterns of growth led them inexorably into 
crisis.
By 1986, Japan was on the edge of serious recession due to the sudden
collapse of exports, resulting from the Plaza Accord and the exploding
yen. The Japanese government sought to respond by precipitating 
the nancial ‘bubble’ of the late 1980s. It sharply reduced interest 
rates and promoted the massive step up in private borrowing in order
to articially raise the value of Japanese manufacturers’ assets in land
and equities, with the goal of stimulating sufcient investment not 
only to restore export competitiveness but also to begin to re-orient 
the economy toward the home market. A huge expansion of the capital
stock did materialize but it was insufcient to compensate through
productivity increase the increase in costs brought by the rising yen.
Meanwhile, Japanese banks became exceedingly vulnerable, due to
massive lending that had failed to revive their debtors’ protability or
prospects.
The German economy witnessed a somewhat analogous pattern of
export impasse, followed by temporary government stimulus. Through
most of the 1980s, the government sought, as usual, to stimulate growth
through dynamizing exports by keeping down domestic costs through
tight credit and scal stringency. But, because the resulting domestic
deation brought an implacably rising currency, exports could not really
take off, and the economy stagnated. Toward the end of the 1980s, the
economy began to benet from the macroeconomic loosening that took
place across the advanced capitalist economies in the wake of the stock
market crash of 1987. Then, in response to unication, the German
government unleashed a massive programme of subsidies aimed at
reconstructing the East German economy. The ensuing transfer of funds
from West to East Germany provided a major shot in the arm to West
German rms, pumping up the call for their goods. Nevertheless, the




















































































record-breaking government decits that nanced the expansion could
not but issue in a major are-up in ination, so that the days of the
German upturn were numbered.
In the end, both the Japanese and German government were obliged
to sharply raise interest rates to gain control of their respective runaway
booms. But, in so doing, they precipitated major cyclical downturns,
especially by bringing about still another extended period of the revalua-
tion of their respective currencies. The situation was made that much
worse when the US refused to assume its usual role of providing the
macroeconomic stimulus required to bail out the world economy from
recession. German and Japanese export growth, already reduced after
1985, fell sharply from 1991 causing the collapse of manufacturing prot-
ability and the onset of the most serious recessions of the post-war epoch
in both places, which extended through mid-decade (see gs 3 and 4).6
3 FROM INTERNATIONAL CRISIS TO WORLD
RECOVERY, 1995–2000?
By the spring of 1995, the yen had risen to 80 to the dollar and the
Japanese economy appeared in deep trouble. The G-3 powers agreed to
coordinated action to push the dollar up. The yen did fall more or less
immediately and so also did the mark and in 1995–6, the Japanese and
German economies emerged strongly from their recessions. But the
process did not end there.
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The fall of the dollar from 1985 had detonated a slowly-developing
chain reaction. In its wake and within the context of a world economy
plagued by over-capacity and over-production, one economy after
another economy would see its manufacturing sector brought down 
by rising exchange rates. The Japanese and German economies had, 
of course, been struck rst, when the dollar fell. But when ‘the re-
verse Plaza Accord’ of 1995 set off the devaluation of the yen, the 
other East Asian economies, with their own currencies tied to the dollar,
could not but be hard-hit. The ensuing crisis would, moreover, soon
boomerang back against Japan and ultimately strike hard at the US 
as well.
East Asia had been the only region of the world economy to enjoy
truly dynamic expansion during the decade 1985–95, helped by a whole
series of developments. Japanese manufacturers were, in this period,
attempting to respond to their competitiveness and protability 
problems by way of a large-scale reorientation to East Asia and they
made enormous direct investments in the region, while stepping up 
their exports there of capital and intermediate goods, so as to pave 
the way for increased penetration of both the US market and the 
fast-growing Asian ‘domestic’ market. The economies of South East Asia
had, for their part, from the end of the 1980s deregulated their nancial
markets to allow ease of capital outow as well as capital inow 
and had afrmed the peg of their currencies to the dollar to make for
exchange rate stability. The goal of course was to attract bank loans 
and portfolio capital to the region and massive short-term ows did
materialize, very much amplied by the huge growth in world liquidity
of these years. The latter was engendered at the start of the 1990s 
by the US Federal Reserve’s deep reduction of real short-term interest
rates to cope with recession and nancial fragility; it was maintained 
by the Japanese government’s attempts to reate the economy, after 
the bursting of the bubble. The attractiveness of investment in the 
region was made all the greater by the decade-long decline in the value
of the dollar and thus of most of the region’s currencies, vis-à-vis the
yen. A spectacular boom ensued throughout the region, fuelled to 
the point of overheating by speculative inows which exacerbated the
already existing regional and international over-capacity in manufac-
turing and which, in its later stages, precipitated stock market, land 
and construction bubbles (Bello, 1998; Bevacqua, 1998; Bernard, 1999;
Eichengreen, 1996: 186–91).
But when the yen fell precipitously beginning in the second part of
1995, hard on the heels of the devaluation of the Chinese currency in
1994, the super-fast growth that had come to be taken for granted
throughout the region was put in jeopardy. It is, of course, a good ques-
tion what would have happened had the East Asian economies resisted




















































































the lure of cheap, short-term credit and gone off the dollar peg. But, in
the interest of what appeared to be a never-ending ow of cheap short-
term loans, they did not and the international nancial crisis of 1997
was a foregone conclusion.
The general response throughout most of East and South East Asia to
intensied competition and weakening demand for their goods was to
pour even more money into new plant and equipment. This appears
paradoxical but in view of the impossibility of a protable reorientation
to the home market in the short term, manufacturers in the region had
little choice but to try to improve their export competitiveness through
greater investment, even at the risk of exacerbating over-capacity.
Virtually all of these economies suffered sharp reductions in their export
growth, current account balances and prot rates, under the impact of
intensied Japanese, as well as Chinese competition, not only in other
markets but in Japan itself, as the growth of overseas sales in the region
as a whole fell from 20 percent in 1995 to 4–5 percent in 1996–7. As it
became obvious that growth prospects had been signicantly reduced
and as corporate nancial problems began to manifest themselves – even
though local construction and stock market booms temporarily
continued, driven by currencies that were rising with the dollar – the
inux of outside funds slowed, leading to speculative attacks on local
currencies, which forced very major, competitive devaluations across the
region (Brenner, 1998: 258–60).
In this situation, Western and Japanese banks, which had been pouring
in money to nance both manufacturing over-production and domestic
over-building, suddenly began a rush to withdraw their mostly short-
term capital, precipitating a run on the money markets. East Asia found
itself suffering from the familiar domino effect that marks an acceler-
ating debt crisis, the same sort of downward spiral that is experienced
in a stock market panic. Each foreign lender feared that all the others
might withdraw their money and tried to get out as quickly as possible.
The result was the self-fullling disappearance of overseas credit from
the economy of the region, which made it impossible for producers, used
to routinely rolling over their loans, to honour their commitments. The
situation was made very much worse by the fact that Asian borrowers
were having to repay their foreign loans with currencies that had lost
much of their value and that exceedingly high debt-equity ratios were
common throughout the region.
At this juncture the IMF, directed by the US Treasury, stepped in. The
IMF might have attempted to get the international banks to agree to act
together to keep their money owing into Asia so as to counteract the
panicky withdrawal of credit, for pouring in money is the normal remedy
for a liquidity crisis. After all, the underlying problem facing Asian rms
was, in the main, the insufcient international demand for their goods,




















































































not the inefciency of their production, let alone their dependence upon
(non-existent) government decit spending. But concerned as it had been
during the Latin American debt crisis mainly to see that US, European
and Japanese banks would be repaid in full and that the region’s
economies would be opened up and liberalized, the IMF demanded in
Hoover-like fashion that credit be tightened and scal austerity be
imposed, radically exacerbating the domestic economic crisis and thereby
the debt crisis and inviting devastating depression (Furman and Stiglitz,
1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Wade, 1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998).
The crisis in East Asia, which broke out in the summer of 1997 steadily
worsened over the following year. During the summer of 1998, it spilled
over into the less developed world, precipitating nancial collapse in 
Russia and crisis in Brazil during the summer of 1998, which threatened
the heartlands of capitalist development.
The Japanese economy had sought to surmount its own problems of
reduced competitiveness in the face of world over-capacity by means 
of a profound reorientation of direct investment, trade and bank nance
to East Asia. Especially in response to the ever-ascending yen and the
correspondingly declining East Asian currencies, Japanese corporations
had, after 1985 and even more after 1990, launched a huge wave of
foreign direct investment in the region, relocating signicant portions of
their lower end production facilities in Thailand, Malaysia and the
Philippines and bringing their networks of suppliers with them. They
thereby not only gained better access, by indirection, not only to the
crucial US market, but were able to prot enormously from the spec-
tacular takeoff of the East Asian domestic market. Simultaneously, their
Japanese-based plants secured growing markets for their capital goods
and intermediate goods from East Asian importers, including their own
overseas subsidiaries. Finally, as the East Asian boom gathered speed,
Japanese banks found a seemingly endless demand for their credit. 
But, the entire effort backred in the face of the contradictions built 
into world over-capacity and over-production in manufacturing: when
Japan, with the help of the US and Germany, devalued the yen to pull
itself out of its recession, it set off the crisis in East Asia, cutting off 
its own path to recovery. As East Asian markets contracted and East
Asian currencies collapsed, Japan’s growth motor once again stalled
(Bevacqua, 1998).
The US economy, which had been experiencing a fairly unimpressive
cyclical recovery through mid-decade, suddenly gathered speed in 1996.
The boom had its roots, as noted, in rising manufacturing protability,
which was strongly buttressed by accelerating manufacturing exports and
which led to accelerating manufacturing investment. But it was increas-
ingly driven as well by the enormous growth of domestic consumption,
which was itself heavily derived from the ‘wealth effect’ that resulted




















































































from the runaway rise in equity prices, which increasingly lost contact
with the gains in prots that supposedly underpinned them from 1995.
Big capital gains, sharply reduced rates of saving and the spectacular
growth of private debt, both corporate and consumer – all based on rising
stock values – put more money in consumers’ pockets, making for spec-
tacular growth in domestic sales. By 1997, it looked as if a growing US
boom, still heavily based on exports – if increasingly subsidized by stock
market-based consumption – might nally set off an upward spiral of
international growth, pulling the world out of its stagnation and thereby
creating a growing market for its goods and so on.
Nevertheless, as the mark and especially the yen underwent large-scale
devaluations from the second half of 1995 and the dollar began a new
ascent, US manufacturing competitiveness was, once again, increasingly
threatened. When the Asian crisis hit, US producers faced not only
stepped up competition from their chief rivals in Japan and Germany
and elsewhere in Western Europe but also the collapse of their East 
Asian export markets and the ooding of US markets by cheap East Asian
exports. During the course of 1998, US export growth, the essential motor
of the boom, fell almost to zero and the key US manufacturing sector
was set for a fall. The manufacturing prot rate could not but decline,
as it did during the course of 1998 and this fall in earnings was, from
the middle of the year, registered in sharply falling US share prices. The
stock market decline threatened to end the US boom by bringing to an
end the binge of consumption, which, in the wake of the collapse of
export growth, was the boom’s main source of support. Since the US was
the world’s consumer of last resort, a recession in the US threatened to
plunge the rest of the world economy, already in crisis (outside of Europe),
into real depression.
Between the end of July and the end of September, as much of the
less developed world entered into crisis, the US stock market fell by 20
percent and by October a liquidity crisis was unfolding. It was at this
point, as noted earlier, that Federal Reserve Chief Alan Greenspan
stepped in, engineering the bail-out of the LTCM hedge fund and
famously raising interest rates on three occasions. This marked a turning
point, for it gave a clear signal to equity markets that they would not
be allowed to fall, since the US Fed now looked to rising equities to
dynamise the economy by fuelling consumption and in that way
providing the basis for international economic stability. Share prices not
only rebounded, but reassumed their skyrocketing trajectory and the US
economic boom was thus enabled to continue.
Nevertheless, it cannot be over-stressed that by this time the manu-
facturing sector and in particular manufacturing exports had ceased to
drive the US economy, as they had done through 1997, especially since
neither the manufacturing prot rate nor manufacturing export growth




















































































at all recovered in 1999 from their major 1998 drop-offs. The ongoing
expansion now depended for its vitality on exploding consumer demand,
itself driven by an unprecedented explosion of household debt, which
was ultimately rooted in, and in turn, fuelled runaway share prices. 
It had something of the character of a nancial chain letter, but it made
for continuing expansion. It should be added that the debt-driven growth
of US consumption sucked in imports at a phenomenal pace, while the
stagnation of much of the world’s economy limited US export growth.
The inevitable outcome was record-breaking US trade and current
account decits. But these have kept the world economy turning over
and begun to produce a new upturn in both East Asia and Europe. In
effect, a new form of articial demand stimulus by means of private
decits – both corporate and consumer – made possible by the Fed’s
assurance to the stock markets, was substituted for the old Keynesian
public ones. By the same token, it is mainly the stock market boom,
buttressing the consumption boom, that stands in the way of a new
recession and perhaps worse.
CONCLUSION: CAN THE BOOM BE SUSTAINED?
There can be no doubt that the current US economic boom has real roots.
Above all, the rate of prot in the manufacturing sector, long depressed,
came back during the 1990s to its level at the end of the 1960s 
and though still signicantly below its mid-1960s peaks, it brought 
the rate of prot for the private business economy as a whole within
shouting distance of its levels at the height of the post-war boom. Indeed,
the after tax prot rate for the corporate economy as a whole, benet-
ing greatly from the tax breaks of the late 1970s and 1980s, by 1997 
about equalled its peak of 1965–66. The recovery of the rate of prot 
has made for a signicant increase in investment, starting around 
1993 and this is perhaps the most irrefutable sign of the boom’s power.
It is also undeniable that, after experiencing an unimpressive expansion
during the rst half of the decade, the economy took off from 1996 
and during the next four years, all of the major macroeconomic indica-
tors including real wages, increased rapidly, while unemployment fell 
to its lowest levels in 30 years. Most signicant perhaps, manufac-
turing productivity growth seems to have leapt forward and from 
1996, productivity growth for the non-manufacturing economy also 
accelerated.
Amid all the hype, the actual dimensions of the current boom must
be kept in perspective. In an outburst of enthusiasm for country 
and capitalism, US Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan crowed that
‘It is safe to say that we are witnessing, this decade in the US, history’s
most compelling demonstration of the productive capacity of free 




















































































peoples operating in free markets’. This is far from the truth. The per-
formance of the US economy in the 1990s did not remotely compare to
that of the rst three decades of the post-war era. Even during its suppos-
edly epoch-making four-year economic expansion between 1995 and 1999,
the business economy as a whole was unable to match its twenty-three
year economic expansion between 1950 and 1973 in terms of the average
annual growth of GDP (4.0 percent versus 4.2 percent), labour produc-
tivity (2.5 percent versus 2.7 percent) or real wages (2.1 percent versus
2.7 percent), or the rate of unemployment (4.7 percent versus 4.2 percent).
Of course, between 1950 and 1973, US economic performance did not
come close to that of most of Western Europe and Japan. Still, it cannot
be denied that the economic expansion of the 1990s as a whole, when
the burst of growth from 1996 is taken into account, did mark an improve-
ment over that of the 1980s and 1970s and the recent boom is indeed
impressive. Will it continue?
In terms of the argument advanced here, the answer to this question
ultimately depends on whether systemic over-capacity and over-produc-
tion in manufacturing has been overcome. Have the deep recessions and
crises of the 1990s – in Germany and Japan in the rst half of the 1990s,
then in Asia and elsewhere from 1997 – resulted in a sufcient shakeout
of oversupplied lines – the elimination of redundant means of produc-
tion so as to pave the way for their replacement by complementary 
ones – to create the basis for a powerful cyclical boom and beyond that



















































































































































a new long upturn? Has the apparently dramatic reallocation of resources
to newly developing high-technology lines that appears to have been
made possible by the recent US investment boom contributed signi-
cantly to the same effect? Especially in view of the inevitable lag in the
appearance of up-to-the-minute data, it is no doubt too early to tell. 
But there are reasons for doubt. Above all, the Japanese economy has
continued to stumble, having been hit once again by a major revalua-
tion of the yen. The German economy similarly dependent upon
manufacturing exports though not in recession like the Japanese, has
been slow to emerge from the 1998–99 slowdown. Even the US has been
barely able to increase its exports during 1998 and 1999.
According to a survey by the The Economist taken early in 1999, ‘Thanks
to enormous over-investment, especially in Asia, the world is awash
with excess capacity in computer chips, steel, cars, textiles, and chemi-
cals. . . . The car industry, for instance, is already reckoned to have 
at least 30% unused capacity worldwide – yet new factories in Asia 
are still coming on stream’. The Economist goes on to assert, along lines
analogous to those argued here, that ‘None of this excess capacity is
likely to be shut down quickly, because cash strapped rms have an
incentive to keep factories running, even at a loss, to generate income.
The global glut is pushing prices relentlessly lower. Devaluation cannot
make excess capacity disappear; it simply shifts the problem to some-
body else’. The upshot, it concludes, is that the world output gap –
between industrial capacity and its use – is approaching its highest levels
since the 1930s (‘Could It Happen Again?’ The Economist, 22 February
1999).
It has been the aim of the US Federal Reserve and the Treasury
Department to pump up US economic growth sufciently to enable the
world economy to transcend the crisis of 1997–98, and international over-
capacity and over-production more generally, by stepping up exports to
the US. It has sought to achieve this end, as stressed, by driving up
share prices, with the goal of unleashing – through providing both
consumers and rms with greater assets and thus better access to nance
– both a consumption boom and an investment boom. In its own terms,
it has succeeded gloriously on both counts. By Alan Greenspan’s own
reckoning, the rise in share prices has added, via the ‘wealth effect’,
about one percent per year to GDP over the past four years. GDP has
therefore been enabled to grow in this period by a full 33 percent more
than it would have in the absence of the stock market boom, at an
average annual rate of 4 percent. Moreover, since the average annual
growth of domestic consumption has outrun GDP by a full percentage
point in this period – to grow an average annual rate of around 5 percent
– imports from overseas have had to expand at the extraordinary annual
average rate of 12 percent, making a pivotal contribution to the revival




















































































of economic growth on the world scale. Investment has simultaneously
accelerated, making possible faster productivity growth and, through
opening the way for rising prot rates, holding out the prospect of a
self-sustaining investment expansion. The US authorities hope that US
consumption demand will thus jump start a true boom in the world
economy, allowing US exports to rise and that US investment demand
will relieve the US economy itself from its dependence on rising
consumption. The fact remains that the by-product of this burst of growth
has been a series of ‘imbalances’ that threaten to bring it to a brutal end.
Above all, the stock market boom has issued in a runaway bubble, 
in which rising stock values have made possible the assumption of
increasing debt to buy equities and drive the stock market still higher.
Investors were quick to note that Alan Greenspan’s intervention in the
credit markets as the international economic crisis threatened to enve-
lope the US in autumn 1998 was not the rst of his bail-outs of the
nanciers and the corporations. In October 1987, he had intervened to
counter the stock market crash and in 1990–1 he had reduced real interest
rates to zero to rescue failing banks and deeply indebted corporations,
in the wake of the leveraged mergers and acquisitions debacle. Nor 
did it escape their notice that the US treasury department went out of
its way to rescue the international banks at the time of the Latin American
debt crisis of 1982, US investors who stood to suffer huge losses as a
result of the Mexican debt crisis of 1994–5 and the international banks
once again in the case of the Asian crisis of 1997–8. They therefore drew
the conclusion that Greenspan simply will not allow stock prices to fall
too far, all the more so because they realize how dependent the current
economic expansion had become on consumption and thus the bull
market (Miller et al., 1999). Believing that the risks of holding stocks had
been sharply reduced – that the Fed would intervene if equity prices
fall to far too fast – they continued to pile into the market with 
‘irrational exuberance’, even as equity prices increasingly lost contact
with the company prots that could justify them. Between 1982 and
1994, the rise of the S&P 500 Index and the New York Stock Exchange
Composite Index did not very much outrun the rise of corporate prots.
But, from that point on, the former entirely lost contact with the latter
and in Spring 2000, the S&P 500 price-earnings ratio hit the unprece-
dented level of around 45: 1, a good 30 percent above the level of 1929
(Shiller, 2000: 6).
To make possible their consumption and their share purchases, both
individuals and corporations have assumed unprecedented levels of debt.
As is notorious, US personal savings, already low by international stan-
dards and falling during the 1980s, plummeted to zero from 6 percent
during the 1990s. With their assets apparently rising sharply due to the
appreciation of their stocks, individuals have been borrowing at a record




















































































pace. During the last four to ve years both personal and consumer debt
as a percentage of GDP have been at their highest levels in history.
Corporations have resorted to debt no less than have individuals. Taking
up where they had left off during the leveraged mergers and acquisitions
craze of the 1980s they have done so, moreover, almost entirely for the
purpose of buying stocks. The resumption of the mergers and acquisi-
tions movement accounts for a good part of this purchasing. But, it reects
also the desire of corporate executives – who receive a good part of their
income in stock options (and typically not in dividends) – to drive 
up company stock values by buying back company shares and to do so
by resorting to debt. In 1998, non-nancial corporations borrowed a total
of $343 billion: they used $80 billion of this total to nance plant and
equipment expenditures that their retained earnings were insufcient to
cover; they used the remainder, an extraordinary $267 billion, to buy back
their own equities. Put another way, 100 percent of their stock purchases
were debt-nanced. Since this latter gure represented more than 50 per-
cent of total net equity purchases made during 1998, it may be seen what
a major role the corporations have played in driving up their own stock
prices. Financial institutions and especially the banks, have themselves
massively increased their liabilities in order to get in on the business of
lending to purchasers of stocks, making for a huge growth in the supply
of money, which has been accommodated by a passive Federal Reserve
Board. In short, a boom in stock prices entirely out of line with any rea-
sonable estimate of potential earnings has fed upon itself and now rests
upon a tremendous pyramid of debt. Because of the debt build-up, there
is a serious potential that, after a point, any decline in stock prices could
snowball, as investors are forced to sell. Were such a fall to become at all
serious, it would rein in the runaway growth of US consumption, threat-
ening to turn off the motor driving the world economy.
Because spending has so outrun saving and domestic consumption
has so outpaced domestic consumption, a signicant proportion of the
liabilities that have been incurred in the US have been to investors over-
seas. In 1999, the current account decit as a proportion of GDP hit 
4 percent, to exceed the previous record established during the Reagan
administration. In effect – though not of course by design – foreign
investors have been helping to nance the US consumption boom in
order to stimulate their own economies. During the period of interna-
tional crisis between 1997 and 1999, money owed to the US as a safe
haven. The low interest rates that have been adopted in recent years by
governments in Europe and especially Japan to pull their economies out
of stagnation and recession have also tended to drive money toward the
US. The extraordinary success of US equity markets has, in addition,
increasingly attracted overseas money. But, it is far from clear for how
much longer it will continue to do so.




















































































To the extent that the world economy does not actually expand, in
part in response to the stimulus provided by the US, it is difcult to see
how interest rates abroad can fail to rise. Were they to do so, funds
would likely ow away from the US, which would either oblige US
authorities to raise interest rates in turn or would force down the dollar
and drive up interest rates through that channel. Either way, it is dif-
cult to see how an increase in the cost of borrowing could be avoided.
Alternatively, if over-priced equity prices were to fall signicantly,
money would likely ow rapidly abroad, again forcing up interest rates.
But if interest rates were to rise signicantly, as they seem likely to do,
they would seriously threaten not only the bull market and the growth
US consumption, but the boom itself . . . threatening the world economic
revival. In 1987, in the context of similarly bloated current account decit,
a falling dollar drove up interest rates and precipitated the crash of the
great bull market of the 1980s. Something similar could be in the ofng
in the current conjuncture, but there would be no cash-rich Japan waiting
to bail out the stock market and thereby stabilize the real economy.
In the last analysis, US economic policymakers are counting upon the
consumption-led boom to enable the US economy to place itself upon a
rmer footing and thereby stave off any really serious decline in equity
prices, keeping the international economy expanding. In their favoured
scenario, growing US consumption will stimulate export-led booms
throughout the world economy. It will thereby enable US producers to
regain the high levels of export growth that they achieved through 1997,
on that basis raise their prot rates, their investment growth and their
productivity growth signicantly further and thereby both reduce the
current account decit and better justify elevated equity prices (that have
perhaps in the meantime have sustained a ‘correction,’ but have been
prevented from crashing). For this to happen, the hoped-for increases
in exports internationally will have to take place, in classic Smith fashion,
by means of mutually self-reinforcing growth through specialization and
the gains from trade. But the latter would require that the products that
each region places upon the world market would mainly complement
one another rather than compete and prove redundant, a pattern that
has, however, proved elusive for at least a couple of decades. In other
words, the systemic over-capacity and over-production that has long
made for stagnation and crisis will have had to be transcended. Whether
it actually has or not remains the ultimate question.
NOTES
This article was submitted and completed in March 2000.
1 See also my ‘Uneven development and the long downturn: the advanced
capitalist economies from boom to stagnation, 1950–1998’, New Left Review
no. 229, May–June 1998.


































































































































2 See below and cf. Brenner, 1998: 24–29.
3 It should be added that representatives of the French Regulation School
advance an additional, supplementary thesis to support the general idea that
faster rising costs was behind the fall of protability that lay behind the
onset of the long downturn (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1986; Boyer, 1998; Lipietz,
1990). Specically, they argue that the declining rate of prot resulted from
a crisis of the Fordist technological paradigm, dened by them as, nothing
more than Taylorism plus mechanization’ (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988: 6
emphasis added). It was thus the product of a ‘crisis of productivity,’ which
manifested employers’ declining capacity to derive productivity gains from
increasing control over the intensity of labour, the break-up of tasks into
their component parts, the standardization of operating practices, the separa-
tion of design and manual labour, the application of machinery, and
ultimately the introduction of the assembly line. But this interpretation is
hard to credit. Why should the economy of the US, which derived more or
less steady gains from mechanization for at least a century before the late
1960s suddenly cease to be able to do so. How could it have been that,
between 1965 and 1973, an ‘exhaustion of Fordism’ could have struck simul-
taneously economies at such different stages of industrial evolution as those
encompassing the G-7? Given that the Japanese economy was so notoriously
successful in securing accelerating gains from mechanization from the 1950s
onwards – and offered to the world a pattern to emulate – why should there
have been a crisis of mechanization? By the same token, why should the
crisis of protability have struck Japan so harshly as it in fact did, when
Japan was so obviously enjoying increasingly rapid productivity growth?.
Finally, why should one focus so single-mindedly on mechanization as the
source of productivity gains, when it is so obvious that for over a century,
industrial improvements were increasingly derived, beyond mechanization,
from the application of scientic knowledge to technology, in eld after eld,
including especially in such core sectors of the ‘second industrial revolution’
as petrochemicals and electricity. Nor is there signicant empirical support
for the idea of a ‘crisis of fordism’. There is no evidence of a relatively slow,
secular decline in productivity, as there should have been, if productivity
problems had derived from an ‘exhaustion of Fordism.’ Even though the
great bulk of the fall in protability took place in the manufacturing sector,
there is no evidence that manufacturing productivity growth fell at all in
either the US or in the G-7 economies taken together between 1965 and 1973.
When productivity growth nally did clearly decline, as it did after 1973, it
fell precipitously not gradually, as it should have, if it were actually reecting
a decreasing capacity to derive productivity gains from mechanization.
Indeed, since the fall in productivity growth was delayed until after 1973,
it appears most sensible to interpret it as a result, not a cause, of the prof-
itability decline . . . deriving from the sharp fall in the growth of investment
precipitated by the fall in the prot rate. (Brenner and Glick, 1991, esp. 
pp. 96–105; Brenner, 1998).
4 See also below, Bar Graph: The Growth of Exports (Fig. 4)
5 It must be cautioned that the precise dimensions of the productivity growth
acceleration remain uncertain, due to problems in interpreting the data 
that have arisen as a result of major recent changes in the methods and 
denitions used by the government in compiling the productivity gures.
My inclination to give some credence to the government’s revised data 







































productivity growth in the past six or seven years is based heavily on the
belief that the signicant acceleration of investment growth that has followed
on the heels of the protability improvement has likely borne fruit.
6 For the developments in the Japanese and German economies outlined in
the previous four paragraphs, see Brenner, 1998: 213–234.
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